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INTRODUCTION 
 
Suppose that while you are travelling under suspicious 
circumstances, the police stop and question you. Because you were not 
expecting this, you exhibit a nervous demeanor that provides the 
officers with reasonable suspicion, and they detain your luggage. The 
officers do not have probable cause to search your bag, but they do so 
anyway, only to discover that you are carrying $100,000 in cash. 
Although the search clearly violates the Fourth Amendment,1 certain 
jurisdictions would permit the government to initiate a forfeiture 
proceeding on the illegally seized currency. Some of these 
jurisdictions, however, would not permit you to use the exclusionary 
rule in this civil forfeiture proceeding.2 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2012, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., Political Science and Legal Studies, 2008, University of 
Wisconsin–Madison. I would like to thank Louis Hu for his invaluable help and 
encouragement. 
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 
(1914), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
2 See, e.g., People v. $241,600 U.S. Currency, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1100, 1113 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the “application of the exclusionary rule in civil 
forfeiture actions is unnecessary”). 
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The Framers’ purpose in drafting the Fourth Amendment was to 
provide American citizens with an indefeasible right against 
unreasonable search or seizure.3 The judicially created exclusionary 
rule seeks to protect that right by excluding from trial any evidence 
obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure.4 Typically, the 
exclusionary rule applies only in criminal trials.5  
However, the United States Supreme Court has held that, in 
determining whether to invoke the exclusionary rule outside of the 
criminal trial context, courts must balance the benefits of deterrence 
against the costs to society.6 Under the Supreme Court’s approach, the 
benefits of deterrence may be low if the officers conducted the search 
for criminal prosecution purposes. In that situation the exclusion of 
evidence in a civil proceeding would be unlikely to provide significant 
additional deterrence, since application of the exclusionary rule in the 
criminal trial has already served to deter the officers from committing 
future Fourth Amendment violations.7 Moreover, the cost to society of 
excluding probative evidence is relatively high.8 As a result of these 
relative costs and benefits, certain jurisdictions have declined to apply 
the exclusionary rule to civil forfeiture proceedings.9 Courts’ refusal to 
apply the exclusionary rule10 outside the criminal trial context appears 
to weaken the fundamental right against unreasonable search and 
seizure. 
This Note will examine the evolution of the exclusionary rule and 
its application to proceedings outside of the criminal trial context. 
                                                 
3 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), overruled on other grounds 
by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
4 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruled on other 
grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
5 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. 
6 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974). 
7 See id. 
8 See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449 (1976). 
9 See, e.g., $241,600 U.S. Currency, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 1113. 
10 See, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998); INS 
v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984); Janis, 428 U.S. at 460; United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). 
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First, the Note will focus on the Supreme Court’s development of the 
exclusionary rule as a sanction used in criminal trials to deter law 
enforcement officers from violating citizens’ Fourth Amendment 
rights.11 Second, the Note will examine the Supreme Court’s 
application of the exclusionary rule to quasi-criminal forfeiture 
proceedings in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania.12 Third, 
the Note will examine the Supreme Court’s reluctance to extend the 
exclusionary rule beyond the criminal trial context, focusing on the 
cost-benefit analysis test applied by the Court.13 Fourth, the Note will 
examine the confusion that has developed in state and lower federal 
courts with respect to Plymouth14 and the subsequent cases in which 
the Court applied the cost-benefit analysis and failed to invoke the 
exclusionary rule outside of the criminal trial context.15 Fifth, the Note 
will examine United States v. Marrocco,16 a recent Seventh Circuit 
case that contained a pertinent concurring opinion by Judge 
Easterbrook relating to the application of the exclusionary rule in civil 
forfeiture proceedings.17 Finally, the Note will investigate the 
questioned validity of the Plymouth holding and its impact on modern 
forfeiture proceedings. Because the viability of Plymouth is in 
question, the Court’s cost-benefit analysis could determine whether to 
invoke the exclusionary rule in the context of civil forfeiture. While 
                                                 
11 See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. 
12 See 380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965). 
13 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349. 
14 See United States v. $191,910 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th 
Cir. 1994) superseded in part by statute, Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202. (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule is applied to forfeiture actions based on the precedent established 
in Plymouth); People v. $241,600 U.S. Currency, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1100, 1113 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1998) (distinguishing the Plymouth precedent and holding that the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to civil forfeiture proceedings using 
the Court’s cost-benefit analysis).   
15 See Scott, 524 U.S. at 369; Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050; Janis, 428 
U.S. at 460; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354. 
16 578 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 2009). 
17 Id. at 642 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
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the cost-benefit test has never applied the exclusionary rule beyond the 
criminal trial context, the changing objectives of law enforcement 
officers, and the changing statutory structure of civil forfeiture 
statutes, suggests that the cost-benefit analysis should weigh in favor 
of applying the exclusionary rule in civil forfeiture proceedings. 
 
I. FRAMING THE ISSUE: THE EVOLUTION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY 
RULE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides:  
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.18 
 
The premise underlying the Framers’ drafting of the Fourth 
Amendment was that American citizens have indefeasible rights to 
personal security, personal liberty, and private property, which may 
only be restricted after the state has probable cause to suspect that a 
citizen has committed a crime.19 For years, however, the Court 
searched for a remedy for American citizens who were subjected to 
unreasonable searches or seizures.20 In 1914, the Supreme Court 
developed the judicial remedy known as the exclusionary rule to better 
safeguard Americans’ Fourth Amendment rights.21 In Weeks v. United 
States, a United States Marshal entered Fremont Weeks’s home 
                                                 
18 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
19 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), overruled on other 
grounds by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
20 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
21 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruled on other 
grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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without a warrant and seized books, letters, money, papers, and notes, 
along with other property.22 Weeks petitioned the court for the return 
of his property, contending that the warrantless search of his home 
violated the Fourth Amendment.23 The district court denied Weeks’s 
petition and admitted the illegally seized property into evidence.24 
Weeks appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.25 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court concluded: 
 
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held 
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, 
the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment, declaring his right 
to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no 
value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as 
well be stricken from the Constitution.26 
 
While “the efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the 
guilty to punishment [was] praiseworthy,” such efforts “are not to be 
aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established b[y] years 
of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in 
the fundamental law of the land.”27 The Court also referenced its 
decision in Adams v. New York, stating that “the [Fourth] Amendment 
was intended to secure the citizen in person and property against 
unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of the law.”28 
By admitting illegally seized property into evidence, the Court “would 
. . . affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open 
defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the 
protection of the people against . . . unauthorized action.”29 Because 
                                                 
22 Id. at 387. 
23 Id. at 388. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 389. 
26 Id. at 393. 
27 Id.   
28 Id. at 394 (citing Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904)).  
29 Id. 
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the United States Marshal’s warrantless search was a direct violation 
of the Fourth Amendment, the district court erred by admitting the 
property into evidence.30  
Although the Supreme Court developed the exclusionary rule in 
Weeks to serve as a judicial safeguard of citizens’ Fourth Amendment 
rights, there was a limitation—the exclusionary rule was only 
applicable against the federal government and its agencies.31 
In 1961, the Supreme Court overturned Weeks in part, when it 
held in Mapp v. Ohio that the exclusionary rule also applied to state 
criminal trials.32 The Court concluded that, because the Fourth 
Amendment’s right of privacy applied to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the same sanction of 
exclusion used against the Federal Government also should apply to 
the states.33 The Court stated that “[t]he ignoble shortcut to conviction 
left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of 
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest.”34 
The Court has never hesitated to enforce against the states the rights of 
freedom of speech and the press or the right to not be convicted by use 
of a coerced confession; why then would it hesitate to apply the right 
to be protected against unconstitutional search and seizure?35 Should 
the Court allow the state to admit evidence that was unlawfully seized, 
it would in effect encourage disobedience of the Federal Constitution, 
which states are bound to uphold.36 Thus, the Supreme Court 
expanded the exclusionary rule to apply to both state and federal 
criminal prosecutions.37  
 
 
                                                 
30 Id. at 398. 
31 Id. 
32 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
33 Id. at 655. 
34 Id. at 660. 
35 Id. at 656. 
36 Id. at 657. 
37 Id. at 660; see also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
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II. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIED TO QUASI-CRIMINAL 
FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS 
 
Following its decision in Weeks, the Court had never applied the 
exclusionary rule outside the criminal trial context.38 In Plymouth, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the 
exclusionary rule enunciated in Weeks39 and extended to the states in 
Mapp40 was applicable to civil forfeiture proceedings.41 In Plymouth, 
two law enforcement officers observed that a car was weighed down 
in the rear, and subsequently pulled over the vehicle.42 The officers 
identified themselves, questioned the owner, George McGonigle, and 
searched the car, which revealed thirty-one cases of liquor that failed 
to bear Pennsylvania tax seals.43 The officers seized the liquor and car 
and arrested McGonigle; however, the officers did not have a search or 
arrest warrant.44 Pennsylvania filed for forfeiture of the automobile 
pursuant to state statute.45 At the hearing, McGonigle sought dismissal 
of the forfeiture petition on the ground that the forfeiture of the vehicle 
depended on admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.46 The Pennsylvania trial court dismissed the forfeiture 
petition.47  
                                                 
38 See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.   
39 See id.  
40 See 367 U.S. at 660.  
41 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965). 
42 Id. at 694. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.; see 47 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6-601 (West 1964) (“No property rights shall 
exist in any liquor, alcohol or malt or brewed beverage illegally manufactured or 
possessed, or in any still, equipment, material, utensil, vehicle, boat, vessel, animals 
or aircraft used in the illegal manufacture or illegal transportation of liquor, alcohol 
or malt or brewed beverages, and the same shall be deemed contraband and 
proceedings for its forfeiture to the Commonwealth may . . . be instituted . . .”). 
46 Plymouth, 380 U.S. at 694–95. 
47 Id. at 695. 
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On appeal, the intermediate appellate court reversed and directed 
that the automobile be forfeited.48 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
affirming the order of the appellate court, concluded that “the 
exclusionary rule . . . applies only to criminal prosecutions and is not 
applicable in a forfeiture proceeding which the Pennsylvania court 
deemed civil in nature.”49 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether the exclusionary rule applied to the forfeiture proceeding.50 
Initially, the Court examined its decision in Boyd v. United States, 
which involved a forfeiture proceeding by the United States to forfeit 
thirty-five cases of plate glass due to the offender’s failure to pay a 
customs duty.51 The Court quoted the Boyd opinion, which stated “that 
proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a 
man’s property by reason of offenses committed by him, though they 
may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal.”52 The Court in Boyd 
concluded that, because the statute required not only a fine or 
imprisonment for the failure to pay the customs duty, but also that 
such merchandise shall be forfeited, the proceeding was actually 
criminal in nature.53 Believing Boyd to be dispositive of the issue in 
Plymouth, the Court concluded that the exclusionary rule applied 
because the Pennsylvania forfeiture proceeding was “quasi-criminal” 
in nature, since the forfeiture of the vehicle was necessitated by a 
criminal conviction.54 While the Pennsylvania proceeding was 
technically a civil forfeiture proceeding, the Court concluded that in 
substance and effect, it was a criminal proceeding since the forfeiture 
statute that authorized the proceeding affixed penalties to criminal 
acts.55 Thus, “[i]t would be anomalous . . . to hold that in the criminal 
                                                 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 696. 
51 Id. at 696–98 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633–34 (1886)). 
52 Id. at 697 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634). 
53 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633–34. 
54 Plymouth, 380 U.S. at 700.  
55 Id. 
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proceeding the illegally seized evidence is excludable, while in the 
forfeiture proceeding, requiring the determination that the criminal law 
ha[d] been violated, the same evidence would be admissible.”56 The 
Court held that the exclusionary rule applied to the quasi-criminal 
forfeiture proceeding.57  
An important caveat, however, is that the Court’s decision was 
based on the character of the particular forfeiture proceeding at issue, 
and thus, a distinction may be made when a civil forfeiture proceeding 
is not necessitated by a criminal conviction.58 
 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SUPREME COURT’S COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS TEST AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EXTENSION OF THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE BEYOND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
The primary purpose behind the judicially created exclusionary 
rule is to safeguard American citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights 
through deterrence of future unlawful police conduct.59 Since 
Plymouth, the Supreme Court has refused, in a number of cases, to 
extend the exclusionary rule beyond the criminal trial context.60 The 
cost-benefit analysis utilized by the Supreme Court has never applied 
the exclusionary rule outside the context of criminal prosecution 
because the substantial costs to society of excluding concededly 
relevant evidence has always outweighed the deterrence benefits 
achieved through application of the rule.61 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 Id. at 701. 
57 Id. at 702. 
58 See id. at 696. 
59 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). 
60 See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976). 
61 See id. at 448. 
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A. The Court’s Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Grand Jury 
Proceedings 
 
Following its decision in Plymouth, the Court developed a cost-
benefit analysis test in order to determine whether the application of 
the exclusionary rule in situations outside the criminal trial context 
would achieve the rule’s intended purpose, deterrence.62 In United 
States v. Calandra, the Court examined whether a witness summoned 
to testify before a grand jury could answer questions based on 
evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure.63 Federal 
agents obtained a search warrant, which authorized a search of John 
Calandra’s place of business in connection with suspected illegal 
gambling operations.64 The officers failed to uncover any gambling 
paraphernalia; however, the officers discovered a card that indicated 
that Calandra had received periodic payments from Dr. Walter 
Loveland.65 The officers, who were aware that the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office was investigating the possibility that Dr. Loveland had been a 
victim of loan-sharking, seized the letter along with various other 
items, which included books and records of the company.66 Following 
the seizure, the state of Ohio convened a special grand jury to 
investigate the potential loan-sharking activities, which were a 
violation of federal law.67 The grand jury subpoenaed Calandra to 
determine whether the seized evidence related to loan-sharking.68 
Calandra moved to suppress the evidence because the search exceeded 
the scope of the warrant.69 The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio granted Calandra’s motion to suppress and 
ruled that he need not answer any questions related to the seized 
                                                 
62 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349.   
63 Id. at 339. 
64 Id. at 340. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 340–41. 
67 Id. at 341. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. 
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evidence.70 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
affirming the decision, held that “the exclusionary rule may be 
invoked by a witness before the grand jury to bar questioning based on 
evidence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure.”71 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.72 Initially, the Court stated 
that the purpose of the exclusionary rule “is to deter future unlawful 
police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth 
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.”73 In 
deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule to grand jury 
proceedings, the Court “weigh[ed] the potential injury to the historic 
role and functions of the grand jury against the potential benefits of the 
rule as applied in this context.”74 First, the Court determined that the 
application of the exclusionary rule would interfere with grand jury 
proceedings.75 “Suppression hearings would halt the orderly process 
of an investigation,”76 which would “frustrate the public’s interest in 
the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws.”77  
                                                
Next, the Court concluded that the deterrence benefits of applying 
the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings would be fairly low.78 
Extending the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings “would 
deter only police investigation consciously directed toward the 
discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand jury investigation.”79 
The Court stated that “[w]hatever deterrence of police misconduct 
may result from the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from 
criminal trials, it is unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to 
 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 342. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 347. 
74 Id. at 349. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 350. 
78 Id. at 351. 
79 Id.  
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grand jury proceedings would significantly further that goal.”80 
Applying the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings would 
provide a minimal advancement of deterrence of police misconduct 
because the officers are “consciously directed” toward discovering 
evidence admissible in criminal trials.81 Thus, the social costs to the 
grand jury proceeding “outweigh[ed] the benefit of any possible 
incremental deterrent effect” achieved through its application.82 As a 
result, the Court declined to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury 
proceedings.83 
 
B. The Court’s Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Civil Tax 
Proceedings 
 
Using the cost-benefit approach adopted in Calandra, the 
Supreme Court also declined to extend the exclusionary rule to civil 
tax proceedings.84 In United States v. Janis, the Court examined 
whether evidence illegally seized by a state criminal law enforcement 
official was admissible in a civil tax proceeding brought by the United 
States.85 The Los Angeles police had obtained a defective search 
warrant and, when executing the warrant, had uncovered evidence of 
Max Janis’s book-making activity, including cash.86 Based on the 
evidence recovered, the police contacted the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS).87 The IRS determined that Max Janis had not filed a federal 
wagering tax return, which was required for book-making activities.88 
Upon examination of the evidence, the IRS made an assessment 
                                                 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 351–52. 
82 Id. at 354. 
83 Id. 
84 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 460 (1976). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 436. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 437. 
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against Max Janis in excess of $89,026.00.89 Based on the assessment, 
the IRS brought a separate civil tax proceeding in federal district court, 
seeking to levy the cash that the police had seized.90 After Janis moved 
to suppress the evidence seized and to quash the assessment, the 
district court granted the motion because the evidence relied upon by 
the IRS was obtained through the defective search warrant and, thus, 
the assessment was based on illegally obtained evidence in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.91  
On appeal, the Court first noted the deterrent sanction imposed by 
the exclusionary rule, which had already “punished” the Los Angeles 
police by barring use of the evidence in state criminal court.92 The 
Court also reasoned that the illegally obtained evidence would be 
inadmissible in federal criminal court, which meant that the “entire 
criminal enforcement process” had been frustrated.93 Since the federal 
civil tax proceeding fell outside the “zone of primary interest” of the 
Los Angeles police,94 the exclusion of the evidence in a federal civil 
proceeding was “unlikely to provide significant, much less substantial, 
additional deterrence” because the use of the exclusionary rule in the 
criminal trials had already deterred the Los Angeles police from 
conducting illegal searches.95  
Second, the Court noted the substantial cost imposed on society 
by excluding “what concededly is relevant evidence.”96 In declining to 
extend the exclusionary rule to civil tax proceedings, the Court 
concluded that the “additional marginal deterrence” gained by 
applying the exclusionary rule to the federal civil tax proceeding 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 439 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
92 Id. at 448. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 458. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 449. 
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“surely does not outweigh the cost to society of extending the rule to 
that situation.”97  
 
C. The Court’s Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Civil Deportation 
Proceedings 
 
Following Janis, the Supreme Court next declined to extend the 
exclusionary rule to civil deportation proceedings.98 In INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents 
arrested Lopez-Mendoza at his place of work without securing either a 
search warrant to search the premises or an arrest warrant to place the 
occupants into custody.99 Following the arrest, the INS instituted 
deportation proceedings against Lopez-Mendoza.100 In a hearing held 
before an immigration judge, Lopez-Mendoza moved to terminate the 
deportation proceeding on grounds that his arrest had been illegal.101 
The immigration judge concluded that Lopez-Mendoza was deportable 
because the legality of the arrest was irrelevant to the deportation 
proceeding.102 Lopez-Mendoza appealed, and “[t]he Court of Appeals 
vacated the order of deportation and remanded for a determination 
whether Lopez-Mendoza’s Fourth Amendment rights had been 
violated when he was arrested.”103 
On appeal, the Supreme Court applied the same cost-benefit 
analysis it had used in Janis.104 Initially, the Court conceded that the 
exclusionary rule’s deterrence value would likely be higher here than 
in Janis because the INS agents who arrested Lopez-Mendoza were 
the same agents who brought the deportation proceeding against 
                                                 
97 Id. at 453–54. 
98 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984).  
99 Id. at 1035. 
100 Id. 
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 1035–36. 
103 Id. at 1036. 
104 Id. at 1042; see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453–54 (1976). 
 281
14
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 9
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/9
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
him.105 However, the Court pointed to three factors that reduced the 
exclusionary rule’s deterrence value in civil deportation 
proceedings.106 First, the Court noted that deportation was still 
possible regardless of whether the arrest was illegal, as deportation 
was supported by evidence that was derived independently from the 
arrest.107 Second, the Court pointed out that INS agents arrested 
almost 500 illegal aliens per year; however, over 97.5% agree to 
voluntary deportation without a formal hearing.108 Because of this, 
“the arresting officer is most unlikely to shape his conduct in 
anticipation of the exclusion of evidence at a formal deportation 
hearing.”109 Third, “the INS ha[d] its own comprehensive schem
deterring Fourth Amendment violations by its officers.”
e for 
 
e[d] 
 
 the 
f the exclusionary rule.”  
                                                
110 The INS’s 
scheme included regulations that “require[d] that no one be detained 
without reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage, and that no one be 
arrested unless there is an admission of illegal alienage or other strong
evidence thereof.”111 Additionally, new INS officers “receiv
instruction and examination in Fourth Amendment law,” and the INS
punished any immigration officer who committed a Fourth 
Amendment violation.112 The Court concluded that the “INS’s 
attention to Fourth Amendment interests [could] not guarantee that 
constitutional violations w[ould] not occur, but it d[id] reduce
likely deterrent value o 113
In weighing the costs, the Court concluded that the social costs of 
applying the exclusionary rule in the context of deportation 
proceedings would be very high, since the release from custody would 
immediately permit the illegal alien to continue his unlawful presence 
 
105 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1042. 
106 Id. at 1043–45. 
107 Id. at 1043. 
108 Id. at 1044. 
109 Id. 
110 Id.   
111 Id. at 1045. 
112 Id. 
113 Id.  
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in the United States.114 In balancing the benefits of deterrence against 
the costs to society, the Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule 
in civil deportation hearings based on the high social costs of allowing 
an immigrant to remain illegally inside the United States.115 
 
D. The Court’s Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Probation-
Revocation Hearings 
 
Following Lopez-Mendoza, the Court next declined to apply the 
exclusionary rule to probation revocation hearings.116 In Pennsylvania 
Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, parole officers entered Scott’s 
residence—which was his mother’s home—without consent and 
seized five firearms, a compound bow, and three arrows.117 At the 
parole violation hearing, Scott challenged the introduction of the 
seized evidence as a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.118 The 
Court concluded that the societal costs of excluding evidence “are 
particularly high in the context of parole revocation hearings”119 
because “parolees . . . are more likely to commit future criminal 
offenses than are average citizens.”120 Moreover, the deterrence value 
of excluding evidence illegally seized by officers “unaware that the 
subject of [the] search is a parolee” would be marginal because the use 
of the exclusionary rule in criminal trials already deterred these 
officers from conducting illegal searches.121 In that situation, an 
officer would be searching for evidence admissible at a criminal tria
and, thus, would be deterred from obtaining evidence in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, which would be inadmissible at trial.122
l 
 
 
                                                 
114 Id. at 1047.  
115 Id. at 1050. 
116 Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998). 
117 Id. at 360. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 365. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 367. 
122 Id.  
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Additionally, the Court concluded, “even when the officer knows that 
the subject of his search is a parolee, the officer will be deterred from 
violating Fourth Amendment rights by the application of the 
exclusionary rule to criminal trials.”123 In balancing these interests, the 
Court declined to extend the exclusionary rule to parole violation 
hearings.124 
As indicated by the above cases, the Supreme Court has taken 
dramatic steps from its initial decisions in Mapp, Weeks, and 
Plymouth. Following those decisions, the Court has consistently 
applied a balancing test—weighing the benefits of deterrence against 
the costs to society—in deciding whether to invoke the exclusionary 
rule.125 In examining the benefits of deterrence, the Court has focused 
on the fact that officers are generally deterred from conducting illegal 
searches based on the application of the exclusionary rule in criminal 
trials.126 Thus, if the Court found that the officer or agency that 
conducted the search was consciously directed towards criminal 
prosecution, then the Court would conclude that the application of the 
exclusionary rule would lead to only a marginal increase in 
deterrence.127 Moreover, the Court has focused heavily on the costs to 
society in both excluding probative evidence from subsequent 
proceedings and the exclusionary rule’s impact on the administrative 
proceeding.128 In balancing the costs and benefits, the Court’s 
undivided trend has been to decline application of the exclusionary 
rule outside the criminal trial context.129 
                                                 
123 Id. at 368. 
124 Id. at 369. 
125 See Scott, 524 U.S. at 369; INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 
(1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 460 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). 
126 Janis, 428 U.S. at 448. 
127 See id. at 458. 
128 Id. at 449; see also Mark J. Crandley, A Plymouth, A Parolee, and the 
Police: The Case for the Exclusionary Rule in Civil Forfeiture after Pennsylvania 
Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 65 ALB. L. REV. 147, 175 (2001).  
129 See Scott, 524 U.S. at 369; Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050; Janis, 428 
U.S. at 460; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354. 
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IV. THE DIVIDED DECISIONS IN THE LOWER FEDERAL AND STATE 
COURTS 
 
The Supreme Court decisions since Mapp, which have 
consistently declined to extend the exclusionary rule beyond the 
criminal trial context,130 stand in stark contrast to the Court’s decision 
in Plymouth and have left state and lower federal courts questioning 
whether to apply the exclusionary rule in civil forfeiture proceedings. 
At the crux of this confusion is the Plymouth Court’s finding that civil 
forfeiture proceedings are “quasi-criminal” in nature because, like a 
criminal proceeding, the object is to penalize for the commission of an 
offense against the law.131 
Because the Supreme Court’s decision in Plymouth stands in stark 
contrast to its decisions in Janis, Lopez-Mendoza, and Scott, lower 
state and federal courts have been given two options to determine 
whether to apply the exclusionary rule to civil forfeiture proceedings: 
(1) follow the precedent established in Plymouth; or (2) distinguish 
Plymouth, treat the forfeiture as a civil proceeding, and weigh the 
benefit of deterrence against the cost to society. As a result, lower 
courts have continued to provide inconsistent rulings in deciding 
whether the exclusionary rule is applicable to civil forfeiture 
proceedings.132 
 
A. The Ninth Circuit and its Reaffirmation of Plymouth 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is one of 
the lower courts that, following Plymouth, have held that the 
                                                 
130 See Scott, 524 U.S. at 369; Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050; Janis, 428 
U.S. at 460; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354. 
131 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965). 
132 United States v. $191,910 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th Cir. 
1994) superseded in part by statute, Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. 
L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202.; People v. $241,600 U.S. Currency, 67 Cal. App. 4th 
1100, 1113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).  
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exclusionary rule applies in civil forfeiture proceedings.133 For 
example, in United States v. $191,910 in U.S. Currency, officers 
became suspicious of Bruce Morgan after he placed his bags through 
an airport security x-ray machine, and when searched, the officers 
discovered the bags contained a large sum of money.134 The district 
court held that the search was illegal and granted Morgan’s motion for 
summary judgment.135 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision to 
apply the exclusionary rule to the civil forfeiture proceeding.136  
 
B. California State Court: The Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Civil 
Forfeiture Proceedings  
 
In contrast with the Ninth Circuit, California is one state that, 
following Plymouth, has held that the exclusionary rule is not 
applicable to civil forfeiture proceedings.137 In People v. $241,600 in 
U.S. Currency, the California Court of Appeals distinguished its case 
from Plymouth, stating that, “unlike in Plymouth, the forfeiture action 
is an in rem civil proceeding which is not based on a provision 
requiring the claimant to be found guilty of a criminal offense nor 
imposing imprisonment as a penalty for a criminal act.”138 After 
concluding that the case was a purely civil action, the California court 
applied the Janis test to determine whether the deterrence value of 
applying the exclusionary rule to a civil forfeiture proceeding 
                                                 
133 See $191,910 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d at 1063. The Eleventh and Eighth 
Circuits have also held this way. United States v. $291,828.00 in U.S. Currency, 536 
F.3d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule applied to forfeiture actions); United States v. $7,850.00 in U.S. Currency, 7 
F.3d 1355, 1357 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that because forfeiture proceedings are 
quasi-criminal in character, the exclusionary rule applies, barring evidence obtained 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
134 16 F.3d at 1054. 
135 Id. at 1056–57. 
136 Id. at 1054. 
137 See People v. $241,600 U.S. Currency, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1100, 1113 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1998). 
138 Id. at 1111–12. 
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outweighed the societal costs.139 In concluding that the exclusionary 
rule did not apply to civil forfeiture proceedings, the court stated that 
“[t]he likelihood of achieving additional deterrence by excluding 
illegally seized evidence in a civil forfeiture proceeding is not 
sufficient to outweigh the societal costs imposed by the exclusion.”140 
The court reinforced its decision by stating that “[t]o date the United 
States Supreme Court has rejected application of the exclusionary rule 
to civil cases, and we decline to do so as well in this civil forfeiture 
case.”141 
 
V. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN CIVIL 
FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS 
 
To date, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit has remained silent on whether the exclusionary rule would be 
applied in civil forfeiture proceedings; however, in a recent concurring 
opinion, Judge Easterbrook provided insight into how the court may 
decide the issue.142 In United States v. Marrocco, the Seventh Circuit 
was presented with a civil forfeiture case that developed following an 
illegal search of luggage.143 An officer for the Amtrak police had 
searched a computer database and discovered that Vincent Fallon had 
paid cash for a one-way ticket less than seventy-two hours before 
departure, which fit the profile of a drug courier.144 Upon observing 
Fallon enter his compartment, two officers approached and questioned 
him as to whether he was carrying any weapons, drugs, or large sums 
of money.145 During the officers’ questioning, Fallon exhibited a 
nervous demeanor, which provided the officers with reasonable 
                                                 
139 Id. at 1113. 
140 Id. (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453–54 (1976)). 
141 Id. 
142 United States v. Marrocco, 578 F.3d 627, 642 (7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, 
J., concurring).  
143 Id. at 629. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
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suspicion to detain his luggage.146 While Fallon denied the officers’ 
request to search the luggage, he told them that the luggage contained 
$50,000.147 The officers brought the luggage to the Amtrak police 
office, used a pocketknife to open the luggage, and uncovered 
numerous bundles of money.148 Subsequent to the search, the officers 
summoned a canine unit to conduct a sniff of the briefcase.149 The 
canine unit alerted to the briefcase, which served as an indication that 
it contained drugs or money contaminated with drugs.150 The officers 
retained the briefcase and the funds, and the government subsequently 
filed a complaint in federal district court seeking forfeiture of the 
funds under the Controlled Substances Act.151 Prior to trial, Fallon 
filed a motion to suppress the seizure of the funds, and the district 
court granted his motion.152  
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision of the district 
court. 153 The court held that, under the inevitable discovery doctrine, 
it was improper to suppress the funds.154 The court noted that it is 
proper to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine as long as the officers 
show that they “ultimately or inevitably would have . . . discovered 
[the challenged evidence] by lawful means.”155 The court went on to 
state that, to satisfy its burden under the inevitable discovery doctrine, 
the government must first show that it would have obtained “an 
independent, legal justification for conducting a search that would 
have led to the discovery of the evidence.”156 Second, “the 
[g]overnment must demonstrate that it would have conducted a lawful 
                                                 
146 Id. at 630.  
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (2006). 
152 Marrocco, 578 F.3d at 630. 
153 Id. at 642. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 637 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)). 
156 Id. at 637–38. 
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search absent the challenged conduct.”157 The court concluded that the 
officers met the first burden because the result of the dog-sniff test, 
which would have supported the issuance of a warrant, provided an 
independent legal justification for searching the briefcase.158 Because 
the officers already knew that the briefcase contained money, the court 
concluded that the “officers detained the briefcase in order to conduct 
an investigation that would establish a link between the funds and 
illegal activity.”159 The officers also met the second requirement 
because the “investigating officers undoubtedly would have followed 
routine, established steps resulting in the issuance of a warrant.”160 
Based on the government’s satisfaction of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine, the Seventh Circuit overturned the district court’s ruling to 
suppress the illegally seized funds and remanded the case to determine 
whether the funds were subject to forfeiture.161 
While he agreed with the majority’s application of the inevitable 
discovery doctrine, Judge Easterbrook suggested in a concurring 
opinion that the parties failed to argue whether the exclusionary rule 
applied in civil forfeiture cases, which would have superseded the 
doctrine of inevitable discovery.162 In a detailed analysis relating to the 
exclusionary rule in civil forfeiture proceedings, Judge Easterbrook 
stated: 
 
Suppressing the res in a civil proceeding, even though the 
property is subject to forfeiture, would be like dismissing the 
indictment in a criminal proceeding whenever the defendant 
was arrested without probable cause. The Supreme Court has 
been unwilling to use the exclusionary rule to “suppress” the 
                                                 
157 Id. at 638. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 639. 
160 Id.  
161 Id. at 642. 
162 Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
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body of an improperly arrested defendant. Why then would it 
be sensible to suppress the res?163 
 
Judge Easterbrook also distinguished Marrocco from Plymouth, 
stating that “[a]lthough [Plymouth] suppressed evidence in a 
forfeiture, Janis stated that this was because that forfeiture was 
intended as a criminal punishment. The forfeiture in our case is civil. It 
is farther from a criminal prosecution than is a probation-revocation 
proceeding.”164 Judge Easterbrook’s reference to a probation-
revocation proceeding suggested an attempt to align the Seventh 
Circuit’s analysis with the analysis used in Scott.165 Based on this 
inference, it would appear that Judge Easterbrook would invoke the 
cost-benefit test used in Janis,166 which was applied in Scott,167 to 
determine whether the social costs of applying the exclusionary rule 
outweigh the benefits of deterring officers in the context of civil 
forfeiture proceedings.168 While the court did not decide the scope of 
this inquiry, it appears reasonable to suggest that the Seventh Circuit 
would apply the balancing test established in Calandra to determine 
whether to apply the exclusionary rule to civil forfeiture 
proceedings.169 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
163 Id. (citations omitted). 
164 Id. (citations omitted). 
165 See id. 
166 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 460 (1976). 
167 See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998). 
168 See Marrocco, 578 F.3d at 642 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
169 See id. at 643. 
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VI. WITH THE VALIDITY OF PLYMOUTH IN QUESTION, WOULD THE 
SUPREME COURT’S COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS BAR THE EXCLUSIONARY 
RULE IN CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS? 
  
 Since Plymouth, the Supreme Court has never applied the 
exclusionary rule to bar evidence outside the criminal trial context.170 
While the Court has never directly overturned the holding in 
Plymouth, its decisions following Plymouth,171 coupled with the 
changing statutory construction of state and federal forfeiture 
statutes,172 suggests that Plymouth’s validity may be in jeopardy and 
that courts should analyze whether the exclusionary rule applies to 
civil forfeiture using the Court’s current cost-benefit analysis.173 
 
A. Plymouth’s Questioned Validity  
 
Federal courts that have applied the exclusionary rule to civil 
forfeiture proceedings cite the precedent established in Plymouth to 
validate their rulings.174 The basis for their rulings revolves around the 
Plymouth Court’s classification of a civil forfeiture proceeding as 
“quasi-criminal.”175  
The evolution of state and federal forfeiture statutes has, however, 
created a clear distinction between the “quasi-criminal” forfeiture 
proceeding in Plymouth and current civil forfeiture proceedings.176 In 
                                                 
170 See Scott, 524 U.S. at 369; INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 
(1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 460 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974).  
171 See id. 
172 See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2006); see, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 646/85(g)(1)–
(3) (2006). 
173 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354. 
174 See e.g., United States v. $191,910 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1063 
(9th Cir. 1994); United States v. $7,850.00 in U.S. Currency, 7 F.3d 1355, 1357 (8th 
Cir. 1993). 
175 See $191,910 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d at 1063; 7,850.00 in U.S. Currency, 
7 F.3d at 1356. 
176 See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (e)(1)(A); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 646/85(g)(1)–(3). 
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Plymouth, McGonigle’s violation of a Pennsylvania liquor law that 
permitted a fine also subjected his car to forfeiture.177 There, the Court 
classified the forfeiture proceeding as “quasi-criminal” because the 
forfeiture was viewed as an additional penalty for McGonigle’s 
commission of a crime.178 Since the holding in Plymouth, forfeiture 
statutes have evolved.179 The federal forfeiture statute does not require 
the individual possessing the property to be charged with a criminal 
offense; rather, the government need only establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the property seized was used in the 
commission of a criminal offense.180 For example, in Marrocco, 
$7,850.00 in U.S. Currency, and $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, the 
government initiated a forfeiture proceeding absent the claimant’s 
commission of a criminal offense.181 Because of the statutory 
differences in the forfeiture proceedings in Marrocoo, $7,850.00 in 
U.S. Currency, and $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency,182 the court’s 
reliance on Plymouth as precedent is called into question when 
determining whether the exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture 
proceedings.183 
                                                 
177 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 694 (1965). 
178 Id. at 700. 
179 See 18 U.S.C § 981(c)(3) (2006) (stating that if the Government's theory of 
forfeiture is that the property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of a 
criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the 
Government shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the 
property and the offense). 
180 Id. § 981(c)(1) (stating that the burden of proof is on the Government to 
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to 
forfeiture). 
181 United States v. Marrocco, 578 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 2009); United States 
v. $191,910 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1994) (the agents 
instructed the claimant of the illegally seized funds that he was free to leave or 
accompany the bags); United States v. $7,850.00 in U.S. Currency, 7 F.3d 1355, 
1356 (8th Cir. 1993). 
182 See $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d at 1056; $7,850.00 in U.S. 
Currency, 7 F.3d at 1356. 
183 See Plymouth, 380 U.S. at 702. 
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 Furthermore, the Plymouth Court, while applying the 
exclusionary rule to forfeiture proceedings, narrowed its holding by 
stating that it applied only “to forfeiture proceedings such as the one 
involved here,”184 which indicated that the Court’s holding may be 
confined to the facts of that particular case.  
Based on the statutory difference in forfeiture proceedings,185 and 
the notion that Plymouth is confined to its facts,186 the viability of 
Plymouth with respect to current forfeiture law is suspect, and a strong 
argument can be formed that the federal courts of appeals’ reliance on 
Plymouth is outdated and should be replaced with the Court’s current 
cost-benefit analysis.187 
 
B. The Supreme Court’s Cost-Benefit Analysis Could Bar the 
Exclusionary Rule in Civil Forfeiture Proceedings 
  
 Based on the analysis from cases that utilize the cost-benefit 
analysis, a strong argument can be formed that the Court’s cost-benefit 
approach could bar the exclusionary rule in civil forfeiture 
proceedings. Similar to the forfeiture proceedings in Marrocco, 
$7,850.00 in U.S. Currency, and $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, the 
forfeiture proceeding in $241,600.00 in U.S. Currency did not 
necessitate the claimant being found guilty of a criminal act.188 
Because the case was outside the scope of Plymouth, the California 
court followed the precedent established in Calandra and applied the 
cost-benefit analysis to the civil forfeiture proceeding.189  
                                                 
184 Plymouth, 380 U.S. at 702. 
185 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(c)(1), (c)(3) (2006). 
186 See Plymouth, 380 U.S. at 702. 
187 See Scott, 524 U.S. at 369; Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050; Janis, 428 
U.S. at 460; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354. 
188 See People v. $241,600 U.S. Currency, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1100, 1111–12 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998).  
189 Id. at 1113.   
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The California appellate court first weighed the deterrence value 
of extending the exclusionary rule to civil forfeiture proceedings.190 
Because the exclusionary rule is already applied in criminal trials, the 
court concluded that the additional benefit of deterrence from 
excluding the evidence in the forfeiture proceeding would be marginal 
because the officers would be “punished” by the exclusion of evidence 
in state criminal trials.191 On the cost side, the court looked to the 
Janis holding, which stated that the societal costs are high192 due to 
the “inadmissibility of relevant, probative evidence.”193 In balancing 
both sides, the court declined to extend the exclusionary rule to c
forfeiture proceedings because the cost of excluding probative 
evidence outweighed any benefit of deterrence.
ivil 
                                                
194  
This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holdings 
since Plymouth, which have declined to extend the exclusionary rule 
outside the criminal trial context,195 and are supported by the statutory 
distinction between current forfeiture statutes as compared with the 
statute relied upon in Plymouth.196 Thus, under one reading of 
Supreme Court precedent, application of the Court’s cost-benefit 
analysis could bar use of the exclusionary rule in civil forfeiture 
proceedings.197 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190 Id. 
191 Id.  
192 Id. 
193 Id.; see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449 (1976). 
194 $241,600 U.S. Currency, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 1113.  
195 See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998); INS v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 
460 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). 
196 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(c)(1), (c)(3) (2006); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. 
Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 695 (1965). 
197 See $241,600 U.S. Currency, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 1113. 
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VII. REGARDLESS OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT, THE EXCLUSIONARY 
RULE SHOULD APPLY TO CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS 
 
Since Plymouth, the Supreme Court’s resistance in applying the 
exclusionary rule to civil proceedings is well-noted.198 Additionally, 
modern forfeiture statutes, which have evolved since Plymouth, have 
drawn into question whether the conclusion that civil forfeiture is a 
“quasi-criminal” proceeding is still viable today.199 Moreover, the 
Plymouth Court noted that its decision was narrow and applied only to 
“the forfeiture proceeding such as the one involved [in that case].”200 
Notwithstanding the viability of Plymouth or the precedent in 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions, this Note argues in the following 
sections that the exclusionary rule should be applied in civil forfeiture 
proceedings. 
 
A. Quasi-Criminal Forfeiture Proceeding Versus Civil Forfeiture 
Proceeding: A Distinction that Should Not Make a Difference 
 
Recall that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future 
unlawful police conduct.201 As evidenced above, the first step that a 
court would take in holding that the exclusionary rule does not extend 
to civil forfeiture proceedings is to distinguish Plymouth’s “quasi-
criminal” classification.202 Logically, it would follow that, by 
distinguishing Plymouth, a court would analyze its case using the 
Supreme Court’s cost-benefit analysis, which has never applied the 
exclusionary rule to civil proceedings.203 Does the distinction between 
a “quasi-criminal” proceeding and a civil proceeding impact whether 
adequate deterrence would be achieved? In inferring that the 
exclusionary rule might be barred from civil forfeiture proceedings, 
                                                 
198 See, e.g., Janis, 428 U.S. at 460. 
199 See $241,600 U.S. Currency, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 1111–12. 
200 Plymouth, 380 U.S. at 702. 
201 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). 
202 See $241,600 U.S. Currency, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 1111–12. 
203 See Janis, 428 U.S. at 458. 
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Judge Easterbrook stated, “The forfeiture in our case is civil. It is 
farther from a criminal prosecution than is a probation-revocation 
proceeding.”204 Because the exclusionary rule was barred in 
probation-revocation proceedings, it would follow that the rule would 
be barred in a civil forfeiture hearing.205 The correlation betwee
“proceeding” and application of the exclusionary rule is furthered in 
the Janis holding, which stated, “[i]n the complex and turbulent 
history of the rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude evidence 
from a civil proceeding.”
n the 
                                                
206 This idea was also prevalent in 
$241,600.00 in U.S. Currency, which first made sure to distinguish 
itself from Plymouth and qualify its proceeding as civil.207 However, a 
court that focuses on the nature of the proceeding when determining 
whether to invoke the exclusionary rule may overlook the primary 
goal of the exclusionary rule—i.e., deterrence.208 
When examining the deterrence benefits in proceedings outside 
the criminal trial context the Supreme Court has focused on the fact 
that the exclusionary rule already bars evidence in criminal 
proceedings.209 Because the exclusionary rule is applied to criminal 
proceedings, courts have concluded that the additional benefit of 
deterrence from excluding the evidence outside the criminal trial 
context would be marginal because the officers are already “punished” 
by the exclusion of evidence in criminal proceedings.210 While this 
narrow approach fails to determine the actual motive of the officer 
who conducted the seizure, it also fails to adapt to overall changes in 
 
204 United States v. Marrocco, 578 F.3d 627, 642 (7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, 
J., concurring).  
205 See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998). 
206 Janis, 428 U.S. at 447. 
207 See $241,600 U.S. Currency, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 1111–12. 
208 Christine L. Andreoli, Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence in 
Subsequent Civil Proceedings: Focusing on Motive to Determine Deterrence, 51 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1019, 1042 (1983).  
209 See Scott, 524 U.S. at 369; INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 
(1984); Janis, 428 U.S. at 460; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). 
210 See e.g., $241,600 U.S. Currency, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 1113. 
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modern law enforcement objectives.211 There is no question that, when 
law enforcement officers act on the spur of the moment to seize 
evidence and stop crime, “[t]heir fear of evidentiary suppression in the 
criminal trial will have as much deterrent effect as can be 
expected”;212 however, in situations where the officer has first 
identified the person he is investigating, the deterrence value in that 
specific insta 213nce may increase.   
                                                
In the changing climate of police investigations, the 
characterization of the proceeding becomes irrelevant, as a court’s 
overall goal should be to determine whether adequate deterrence has 
been achieved, which can be fulfilled only by evaluating the changing 
objectives of law enforcement agencies that conducted the illegal 
search.214 
 
B. The Changing Objective of Law Enforcement Agencies  
 
Civil forfeiture has evolved as a main objective in modern law 
enforcement.215 The first step developed in the Calandra Court’s cost-
benefit test is to determine whether an officer who conducted the 
illegal search would be further deterred if the exclusionary rule were 
applied and the illegally seized evidence were suppressed.216 
Traditionally, the Court has concluded that law enforcement officers 
are consciously directed towards criminal prosecution, which limits 
any additional deterrence that would be achieved through suppression 
of evidence in a subsequent proceeding.217 However, modern law 
 
211 Crandley, supra note 128, at 160. 
212 Scott, 524 U.S. at 373 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
213 Id. 
214 Tirado v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 689 F.2d 307, 310 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(holding that determining when the likelihood of substantial deterrence justifies 
excluding evidence requires some assessment of the motives of the officials who 
seized the challenged evidence).  
215 Crandley, supra note 128, at 178. 
216 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 352 (1974). 
217 See Scott, 524 U.S. at 369; INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 
(1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 (1976); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 352. 
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enforcement objectives have evolved, which would result in 
substantial deterrence if the exclusionary rule were applied to civil 
forfeiture proceedings.218  
 
1. Modern legislation has provided a changing objective for law 
enforcement officers in forfeiture cases. 
 
Congressional legislation, which for over twenty years “has 
expanded the reach of forfeiture laws,” provides evidence to support 
the changing focus of modern law enforcement agencies.219 In 1970, 
Congress passed 21 U.S.C. § 881, which authorized “the government 
to seize and forfeit drugs, drug manufacturing and storage equipment, 
and conveyances used to transport drugs.”220 The statute’s purpose 
was to inhibit the spread of drugs in a way that criminal prosecution 
could not—“by striking at its economic roots.”221 Criminal 
prosecution may send a drug dealer to jail; however, the operation
the criminal organization would most likely continue under the 
guidance of a subordinate who would likely take over his position.
 of 
 
g 
de 
rfeiture proceedings.  
                                                
222
By attacking the means of production, forfeiture could stop the dru
trafficking business for good.223 Since the initial statute was passed, 
Congress has consistently expanded the reach of the statute to inclu
proceeds traceable to drug transactions.224 Congressional 
encouragement and advancement of the forfeiture statute provides 
evidence that modern law enforcement objectives have evolved to 
focus on civil fo 225
 
 
218 Crandley, supra note 128, at 166–67. 
219 Id. at 166. 
220 Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden 
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 44 (1998); see 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2006). 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 45. 
225 Crandley, supra note 128, at 166. 
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2. Changing governmental policy reflects the changing objectives of 
modern law enforcement agencies. 
 
The Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual of the United States 
Department of Justice also suggests that law enforcement objectives 
have shifted towards forfeiture.226 The guidelines produced by the 
Department of Justice for asset forfeiture illustrate the complex 
planning that is involved in forfeiture proceedings.227 Detailed in the 
2007 “pre-seizure planning” section is the equity threshold necessary 
to pursue a forfeiture.228 The plan requires that the minimum amount 
of cash to be pursued exceed $5,000.229 Furthermore, vehicles must 
exceed $5,000 in value, vessels must exceed $10,000, and aircraft 
must exceed $10,000.230 Additionally, the plan notes that prior to the 
seizure, the agency must determine whether any liens or mortgages are 
involved in the property being pursued so that officers may determine 
whether the agency should go forward with the seizure.231 The 
specificity illustrated in the “pre-seizing” section illustrates the 
conscious direction of law enforcement officers in targeting 
forfeiture.232  
 
3. Civil proceedings provide law enforcement agencies with an 
easier and more efficient tool for crime prevention. 
 
Civil forfeiture also provides law enforcement with an efficient 
and effective weapon in the war against drugs.233 The changing nature 
of criminal activity has led law enforcement agencies to use civil 
                                                 
226
 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ASSET FORFEITURE POLICY MANUAL 1 (2007), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/docs/policy07.pdf. 
227 Id. at 5. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 6. 
230 Id. 
231
 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 226, at 8.  
232 See id. 
233 Crandley, supra note 128, at 161. 
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remedies to achieve criminal justice goals.234 Generally, “civil 
remedies are easier to use, more efficient, and less costly than criminal 
prosecutions.”235  
Procedural advantages have also led civil forfeiture to become a 
popular remedy among law enforcement agencies.236 The two most 
important advantages stem from the legal fiction derived from 
forfeiture cases, that “the property is guilty and on trial.”237 First, 
forfeiture may be pursued even when a lack of sufficient evidence 
prevents a criminal conviction.238 While criminal prosecutions require 
an offender to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, in a civil 
forfeiture proceeding, the government only needs to establish that the 
property is subject to forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence in 
order to effectuate forfeiture.239 Second, forfeiture proceedings lack 
constitutional safeguards that are present in criminal prosecution 
hearings.240 A claimant, challenging the government’s seizure of 
property, is not afforded the right to an attorney, does not receive a 
presumption of innocence, and is unable to use the hearsay 
objection.241 These procedural advantages suggest that the objectives 
of law enforcement officers have been modified to attack drug 
trafficking in an easier and more efficient manner.242  
 
 
 
                                                 
234 Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve 
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law 
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1333 (1991). 
235 Id. at 1345. 
236 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 220, at 46. 
237 Id. at 47. 
238 Id. 
239 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(c)(1) (2006) (stating that the burden of proof is on the 
Government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is 
subject to forfeiture). 
240 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 220, at 46. 
241 Id. at 48. 
242 Cheh, supra note 234, at 1345. 
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4. The Financial Incentive of Forfeiture and Its Impact on Law 
Enforcement Objectives 
 
Law enforcement’s evolving focus on civil forfeiture is also 
supported by the financial incentive achieved through its use.243 In 
1984, Congress enacted two amendments that expanded the power of 
forfeiture.244 The bill’s first amendment provided federal law 
enforcement agencies the right to retain and use proceeds from asset 
forfeitures.245 The second amendment created the federal “equitable 
sharing” program, which provided state and local agencies the greater 
share of proceeds even when federal agents were involved in the 
arrest.246 The equitable sharing program included a “federal adoption” 
procedure, which allowed state agencies that turned seized assets over 
to the Justice Department for federal forfeiture to receive back up to 
80% of the assets’ value.247 These amendments provide state and 
federal law enforcement officers with “a financial motivation to 
expand forfeiture.”248 This incentive also appears in state statutes, 
which allow law enforcement agencies to retain certain percentages of 
assets obtained.249 As a result, the financial incentive provided to law 
                                                 
243 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 220, at 50.  
244 Id.  
245 See 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (2006) (stating that forfeited property may be 
transferred to any federal agency or to any state or local law enforcement agency that 
participated directly in the seizure or forfeiture of the property); see also Blumenson 
& Nilsen, supra note 220, at 50. 
246 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 220, at 51. 
247 Id. 
248 Crandley, supra note 128, at 170. 
249 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 646/85 (g)(1)–(3) (stating that 65% shall be 
distributed to the metropolitan enforcement group or local, municipal, county, or 
State law enforcement agency or agencies that conducted or participated in the 
investigation resulting in the forfeiture; 12.5% shall be distributed to the Office of 
the State’s Attorney of the county in which the prosecution resulting in the forfeiture 
was instituted; 12.5% shall be distributed to the Office of the State’s Attorney’s 
Appellate Prosecutor; and 10% shall be retained by the Department of State Police 
for expenses related to the administration and sale of seized and forfeited property). 
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enforcement agencies further suggests that modern policing objectives 
have evolved to focus on civil forfeiture proceedings. 
 
5. Civil forfeiture statistics support the changing objective of law 
enforcement agencies. 
 
Law enforcement’s increasing focus on forfeiture, which is shown 
by the Department of Justice’s policy manual,250 Congressional 
legislation,251 the efficiency of civil proceedings,252 and financial 
incentives,253 is supported in the Justice Department’s Asset Forfeiture 
Fund, which reported $1.4 billion forfeited during the 2009 fiscal 
year.254 In comparison, in 1994, the Justice Department took just under 
$550 million.255 These statistics suggest that, contrary to the assertion 
that criminal law enforcement officers are focused only on criminal 
prosecution, civil forfeiture has, in fact, evolved to be a significant 
mechanism to hinder illegal conduct.256 Moreover, unlike tax 
assessments,257 parole revocations,258 or deportation hearings,259 
which clearly fall outside the conscious direction of law enforce
officers, the statistics above support the idea that civil forfeiture is 
“ingrained into mainstream police practices.”
ment 
                                                
260 The congressional 
advancement of forfeiture statutes, the policy underlined in the Justice 
 
250 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 226, at 5. 
251 See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2006). 
252 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 220, at 46; Cheh, supra note 234, at 
1333; Crandley, supra note 128, at 161. 
253 See 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 646/85 (g)(1)–
(3).  
254 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Total Net Deposits to the Fund by State of Deposit—
as of September 30, 2009, ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAM (last visited Nov. 17, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/afp/02fundreport/2009affr/report1.htm. 
255 Crandley, supra note 128, at 162. 
256 Id.  
257 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448 (1976). 
258 See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998). 
259 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). 
260 Crandley, supra note 128, at 159–60. 
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Department’s manual, the efficiency of civil forfeiture procedures, and 
financial incentives, all serve as indicators that modern law 
enforcement officers have expanded their objective focus to civil 
forfeiture.261  
 
C. Deterrence and the Changing Law Enforcement Objective 
 
Modern legislation,262 agency policy,263 efficiency of civil 
proceedings,264 and greater financial incentive265 provide sufficient 
evidence to conclude that modern law enforcement officers have 
expanded their objective focus to forfeiture.266 Historically, criminal 
conviction was the primary objective in crime prevention; however, 
today, forfeiture enables law enforcement agencies to fight crime and 
raise money at the same time.267 Moreover, pre-seizure planning adds 
validity to the dissent in Scott, which suggested that a law enforcement 
officer will have “first identified the person he has his eye on,” which 
in turn may increase the level of deterrence achieved through 
application of the exclusionary rule in civil forfeiture proceedings.268 
Because of this, courts must adapt their perspective in analyzing the 
deterrence of officers, in order to gauge the significant benefit of 
deterrence that would be achieved by applying the exclusionary rule in 
civil forfeiture proceedings.269  
 
 
                                                 
261 Id. at 161; see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 220, at 46; Cheh, 
supra note 234, at 1333. 
262 See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2006). 
263 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 226, at 5. 
264 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 220, at 46; Cheh, supra note 234, at 1333; 
Crandley, supra note 128, at 161. 
265 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 220, at 50. 
266 Crandley, supra note 128, at 160. 
267 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 220, at 55. 
268 See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 373 (1998) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
269 Crandley, supra note 128, at 175. 
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D. Societal Costs in Applying the Exclusionary Rule to Civil  
Forfeiture 
 
The societal costs are low in the context of civil forfeiture. The 
second step in the Calandra analysis is to determine the societal costs 
of applying the exclusionary rule to civil forfeiture proceedings.270 
Evidence that could be linked to criminal activity “concededly is 
relevant evidence,” the exclusion of which would impose a significant 
cost to society.271 However, the procedural advantages related to civil 
forfeiture help to alleviate these costs.272 First, notwithstanding the 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, the government may establish 
underlying criminal activity that would lead to forfeiture by 
introducing additional evidence from an independent source, untainted 
by the illegal search.273 Additionally, the government may introduce 
evidence obtained illegally as long as it can illustrate that the 
inevitable discovery doctrine would apply.274 Procedural advantages 
also diminish the costs of excluding the relevant evidence.275 The 
government’s burden of proof, which is beyond a reasonable doubt in 
criminal trials, is lowered to only a preponderance of the evidence in a 
forfeiture proceeding.276 Furthermore, constitutional safeguards that 
are present in criminal trials are absent from civil forfeiture 
                                                 
270 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 352 (1974). 
271 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449 (1976). 
272 Crandley, supra note 128, at 176. 
273 United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 281 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Murray v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988)) (“The independent source doctrine serves 
as an exception to the exclusionary rule and permits the introduction of ‘evidence 
initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later 
obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality.’”). 
274 United States v. Marrocco, 578 F.3d 627, 637 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)) (stating that application of the inevitable 
discovery doctrine is proper so long as the officers show that they “ultimately or 
inevitably would have . . . discovered [the challenged evidence] by lawful means”). 
275 Crandley, supra note 128, at 176. 
276 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 220, at 48. 
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proceedings.277 Finally, even if an illegal search occurs, in the 
instances where the seized item is contraband, the government is not 
required to return the property because of its inherent illegality.278 
Thus, the costs of barring relevant evidence from civil forfeiture 
proceedings are minimized due to the procedural advantages given to 
civil forfeiture and the government’s ability to introduce evidence to 
support forfeiture through the doctrines of inevitable discovery and 
independent source.279  
 
E. The Benefits of Deterrence Outweigh the Costs to Society in the 
Context of Civil Forfeiture Proceedings 
 
As illustrated above, modern police objectives have evolved to 
focus on forfeiture.280 Because of this increased focus, the level of 
deterrence that would be achieved in extending the exclusionary rule 
to civil forfeiture would be substantial.281 Additionally, while costs 
relative to society would arise from excluding relevant evidence from 
trial, procedural mechanisms,282 the inevitable discovery doctrine,283 
and the independent source doctrine284 help to prevent these costs 
from harming the administrative function of civil forfeiture 
proceedings.285 Thus, in weighing the benefits of deterrence agai
the costs to society, the benefits that accrue due to law enforcement’
changing objectives outweigh the social costs, and, as a result, ev
nst 
s 
en if 
                                                 
277 Id. (stating there is no presumption of innocence, no right to an attorney, 
and no hearsay objection afforded to claimants in civil forfeiture cases). 
278 Crandley, supra note 128, at 178. 
279 See Marrocco, 578 F.3d at 637; United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 281 
(3d Cir. 2009); see also Crandley, supra note 128, at 176. 
280
 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 226, at 6; see also Blumenson & Nilsen, 
supra note 220, at 46; Cheh, supra note 234, at 1333; Crandley, supra note 128, at 
161. 
281 Crandley, supra note 128, at 161. 
282 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 220, at 50. 
283 See Marrocco, 578 F.3d at 637. 
284 See Price, 558 F.3d at 281 (3d Cir. 2009). 
285 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974). 
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the Plymouth precedent were overturned, the exclusionary rule should 
be applied in the context of civil forfeiture proceedings. 
                                                
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The uncertain viability of Plymouth, coupled with Supreme Court 
precedent following Plymouth, has brought into question the 
applicability of the exclusionary rule in civil forfeiture proceedings. 
Because the Court has consistently focused on criminal prosecution as 
the sole objective of law enforcement, the Court, using a cost-benefit 
analysis, has refused to extend the exclusionary rule to civil 
proceedings.286 However, the changing objectives of law enforcement 
agencies have led forfeiture to become “ingrained into mainstream 
police practices.”287 Thus, “[t]he unique role of civil forfeiture in 
modern policing makes it sui generis in the level of deterrence the 
exclusionary rule will produce” and would not be outweighed by the 
minimal costs associated with the relatively government-friendly 
proceeding.288  
However, application of the exclusionary rule in civil forfeiture 
proceedings would create new questions, which up to this point have 
been left unanswered. Property seized by law enforcement agencies is 
classified into two different categories: 1) contraband per se and 2) 
derivative contraband.289 Contraband per se is forfeitable without 
regard to the right of the owner due to its inherent illegality.290 In 
contrast, forfeiture of derivative contraband requires the government 
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was 
used, or intended to be used, to facilitate the commission of a crime.291 
 
286 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 (1976). 
287 Crandley, supra note 128, at 160. 
288 Id. 
289 Lalit K. Loomba, Note, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property 
Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 58 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 471, 475 (1989). 
290 Id. at 475. 
291 Id. at 475–76. 
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Money is not contraband per se, and thus, the government must 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it was used, or 
intended to be used, to facilitate a violation of the law.292  
In a situation where money that was illegally seized is the sole 
evidence offered by the government, and neither the inevitable 
discovery doctrine293 nor the independent source doctrine294 applies, it 
would be impossible to establish that the money was in fact derivative 
contraband, due to the application of the exclusionary rule. However, 
even in the absence of evidence, a strong presumption that the money 
is illegal can be supported due to the thorough planning efforts that 
predate the seizure.295 While this presumption cannot be used as 
evidence, courts will be left with the question of what to do with the 
money.  
Certainly, public policy dictates that the agency that conducted the 
illegal search should not benefit from it. Releasing money, however, 
that carries a presumption that it is associated with illegal activity 
would also be contrary to public policy. When the exclusionary rule is 
applied in a criminal setting, the only person receiving the benefit of 
the rule is the person whose rights were violated; however, in the 
context of civil forfeiture, the release of the property would not only 
benefit the carrier of the funds, but potentially the entire criminal 
organization that is supported by the funds. Thus, the application of 
the exclusionary rule in the context of civil forfeiture proceedings 
would leave courts with a new dilemma—what should be done with 
the money, which is a question that will be left for another day.  
                                                 
292 City of Chicago v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 178, 181 (N.D. Ill. 1974).  
293 See United States v. Marrocco, 578 F.3d 627, 637 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing 
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)) (stating that the inevitable discovery is 
proper so long as the officers show that they “ultimately or inevitably would have . . 
. discovered [the challenged evidence] by lawful means”). 
294 See United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 281 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Murray 
v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988)) (“The independent source doctrine 
serves as an exception to the exclusionary rule and permits the introduction of 
‘evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but 
later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality.’”). 
295 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 226, at 5. 
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